I have a 7pm meeting and extreme confidence in the accuracy of my fancy watch. Having lost track of the time and wanting to arrive on time for the meeting, I look carefully at my watch. I reason: 'It is exactly 2:58pm; therefore I am not late for my 7pm meeting'. Again I know my conclusion, but as it happens it's exactly 2:56pm, not 2:58pm.
For Warfield, an example counts as a case of knowledge from falsehood (KFF) just in case both of the following conditions are satisfied by the example (2005: 408).
(1) the example involves inferential knowledge of a conclusion q.
(2) the example involves a false relevant premise p.
Warfield considers various 'resistance' strategies, which attempt to undermine the claim that examples such as these are bona fide KFF-cases. He argues that none of these 'resistance' strategies will succeed. I will not enter into that debate here.
1 Rather, for the purposes of this note, I will just assume that Warfield's assessment is correct. My aim here is only to argue that if such examples are bona fide cases of KFF, then they can be strengthened in some epistemologically interesting ways.
A stronger conception of KFF, and an example thereof
Let us suppose that Warfield is correct -that his example (above) does satisfy both (1) and (2). I am interested in stronger conceptions of KFF. To wit, consider: (3) If the subject's belief p had not been false, then the example would not have constituted a case of inferential knowledge.
To require (3) is to require that the example be a case in which the inferential knowledge (that q, on the basis of p) is counterfactually dependent on the falsity of the relevant premise p. Adding (3) to Warfield's criteria (1) and (2) This might seem to reveal a sense in which the falsity of the subject's belief that p is inessential. Indeed, Coffman (2008: 190-1) conjectures that in all cases of KFF …we can identify a true proposition p′ with the following two features:
• the subject is (at least) disposed to believe p′, and
• if the subject's inferential belief (that q) had been based on a belief in p′, the inferential belief would (still) have constituted knowledge.
Coffman's discussion suggests the following alternative premise (for our cases).
(p′) It is approximately 2:56pm (e.g., it is 2:56pm ± 2 minutes).
As it stands, our current example of KFF* does not seem to be a counterexample to Coffman's conjecture. For all I have said about our example, this (true) alternative premise p′ may well have the two features Coffman desires. In order to turn our example into a case which (also) refutes Coffman's conjecture, we just need to modify it so as to ensure that if I had based my belief that q on a belief in p′, this would have traced back to my looking at the Campanile (not my looking at my fancy watch). 2 So, while the truth of (4) may 3 point (via Coffman's alternative premise p′) to some sense in which the falsity of the subject's belief that p is inessential to the acquisition of inferential knowledge in the original examples of KFF, it seems that the same cannot be said regarding our strengthened examples of KFF*. In other words, it seems that both the falsity and the approximate truth of the subject's belief that p are explanatorily relevant to the presence of inferential knowledge in our examples of KFF*. If this is right, then we have managed to strengthen Warfield's example of knowledge from falsehood in some epistemologically interesting ways.
